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Bodily Intrusion in Search of Evidence: A Study in
Fourth Amendment Decisionmaking
INTRODUCTION
Two recent cases from the United States Supreme Court told two very
different stories about evidence from within the human body.
Arriving in Los Angeles from Bogota, Columbia, Rosa Elvira Montoya
de Hernandez proceeded to Customs where an inspector noticed on her
passport that she had recently made several trips from Bogota to Los Angeles
and Miami. Unconvinced by Montoya de Hernandez' explanation that she
frequently traveled to the United States to buy merchandise for her husband's
department store, the inspector took her to a back room where she was
subjected to a patdown and a strip search. No contraband was revealed,
but the inspector felt a firmness in Montoya de Hernandez' abdomen and
saw that she was wearing two pair of underwear with a paper towel lining
the crotch area.
The inspector suspected that Montoya de Hernandez was a "balloon
swallower" hiding narcotics in her alimentary canal. When she refused to
be x-rayed, Montoya de Hernandez was locked in a small office and told
she could not leave until she squatted over a wastebasket and produced a
monitored bowel movement. She remained locked away in this room without
a bed or a couch, unable to phone her attorney or her husband, for over
sixteen hours before customs officials went to a magistrate for a search
warrant.'
In Richmond, Virginia, Ralph Watkinson was closing his shop for the
night when he noticed an armed man approaching from across the street.
When the man told Watkinson to freeze, Watkinson drew his own gun and
fired on the man who fired back. Watkinson was wounded in the legs and
saw his attacker, apparently wounded in the left side, run away.
A short while later, the police found Rudolph Lee a few blocks away
from Watkinson's shop with a gunshot wound to the left side of his chest.
When Lee was taken to a nearby hospital for treatment, Watkinson who
was being treated for his wounds, exclaimed, "That's the man that shot
me." After Lee was arrested, the prosecutor sought a court order-to surgically
remove the bullet from beneath Lee's collarbone. The bullet could then be
tested to show whether it came from Lee's gun.2
1. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3306-07 (1985).
2. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1985).
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The Supreme Court held that the proposed surgery on Lee would be an
unreasonable search under the fourth amendment,' yet found nothing un-
reasonable in the custom officials' detention of Montoya de Hernandez. 4
These outcomes seem anomalous.' Watkinson spontaneously identified
Lee; Lee was found wounded only a few blocks from Watkinson's shop;
and the location of Lee's wound matched Watkinson's account of the at-
tempted robbery. All of this provided ample reason to arrest Lee and ample
reason to believe surgery would yield relevant evidence. Montoya de Her-
nandez, on the other hand, was detained, subjected to a strip search, and
locked away in a bare room for over sixteen hours, all on a mere hunch.
The immediate solution is that the fourth amendment is applied differently
in the context of a border search. 6 This Note, however, contends that a
more fundamental distinction can be drawn. Winston v. Lee and Montoya
de Hernandez represent more than decisionmaking under separate areas of
fourth amendment law. The two cases represent two fundamentally different
ways of deciding fourth amendment cases. 7
This Note will trace the evolving analysis of bodily intrusion in search of
evidence through a series of four Supreme Court decisions.8 Included will
be a survey of the current status of various bodily searches. This Note will
argue that, taken together, the Supreme Court's bodily intrusion decisions
represent a consistent and workable approach to search and seizure law. As
ad hoc evaluations of reasonableness the Court's bodily intrusion decisions
will be contrasted with the arbitrary line drawing and constant tinkering that
plagues fourth amendment decisions such as Montoya de Hernandez. Ulti-
mately, this Note contends that the Court's bodily intrusion decisions offer
an escape from the bewildering morass that has become fourth amendment
decisionmaking.
3. Id. at 766.
4. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3313.
5. To distinguish Montoya de Hernandez as not involving actual penetration beyond the
body's surface is to ignore the major disruption of the defendant's bodily processes. Just as
the government in Winston v. Lee sought to reach inside of Lee's body to retrieve the bullet,
the government in effect reached inside of the defendant's body to retrieve the contents of her
bowel movements. In both cases, the individual's autonomy over his own body is implicated.
6. "[T]he Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the
international border than in the interior." Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3309. A
separate body of fourth amendment law has grown up in the context of border searches. See
generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATIsE .ON THE FoURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5
(1978 & Supp. 1986); for a discussion of Montoya de Hernandez, see id. at Supp. § 10.5 (a-
1) at 151. For the most part, border search doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. See
infra note 60.
7. See infra notes 137-63 and accompanying text.
8. Those decisions are Winston, 470 U.S. 753; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
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I. PREINcoRPoRATIoN ANALYSIS OF BODILY INTRUSION
A. Rochin v. California
The United States Supreme Court first addressed bodily intrusion in search
of evidence in Rochin v. California.9 The police illegally broke into a nar-
cotics suspect's bedroom. Rochin quickly swallowed two capsules laying on
the night stand. A violent struggle ensued as the police tried unsuccessfully
to retrieve the capsules from Rochin's mouth.'0 Rochin was then taken to
a hospital where a doctor forced an emetic through a tube into Rochin's
stomach. Rochin vomited up the capsules which proved to contain morphine.
Rochin was convicted of unlawful possession of a preparation of morphine.
The chief evidence against him was the two capsules which were admitted
over his objections.
The California appeals court found that the police "were guilty of un-
lawfully breaking into and entering defendant's room and were guilty of
unlawfully assaulting and battering defendant while in the room," and that
the police and the doctor "were guilty of unlawfully assaulting, battering,
torturing and falsely imprisoning the defendant at the alleged hospital.""
The court, however, upheld Rochin's conviction because at that time illegally
obtained evidence was admissible on a criminal charge in California.' 2
Rochin was decided before the fifth amendment and the exclusionary rule
against evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment had been
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The issue before
the Court was the "limitations which the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes on the conduct of criminal proceedings by the
States."' 3 The Court overturned Rochin's conviction with the oft-quoted
holding:
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the con-
science. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle
to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction
of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of gov-
ernment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
9. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
10. At trial one officer testified that "the three deputies jumped upon the defendant, grabbed
him by the throat, and began to squeeze his throat in an effort to eject the capsules from his
mouth; that force was applied to his throat; that defendant 'hollered a little bit'; that he (Jones)
put his fingers in defendant's mouth .... ." People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 140-41,
225 P.2d 1, 1-2 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
11. Id. at 143, 225 P.2d at 3.
12. Id.
13. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165.
1987]
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They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation.1
Rochin marks an interesting point of departure for the analysis of bodily
intrusion. Much of the Court's analysis within the broad contours of prein-
corporation due process is in terms of self-incrimination rather than unrea-
sonable search and seizure. Rochin draws a clear analogy between forcible
extraction of evidence from the body and coerced confession. "It would be
a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history
has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police
cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his
stomach."' 5 This view of Rochin is supported by the Court's refusal to
distinguish "real evidence" from verbal confessions. The Court stated that
to do so would -"ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions."' 16
Regardless of whether "real evidence" from the body was reliable, to forcibly
extract the evidence would be offensive to the community's sense of fair
play. 7
The Court also focused on the behavior of the police. It was a "course
of proceedings" that the Court found constitutionally objectionable. Rochin
acknowledges the "use of modern methods and devices for discovering
wrongdoers and bringing them to book," but refuses to "legalize force so
brutal and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect
as is revealed by this record."' 8 This language indicates an unreasonable
search and seizure line of analysis. The development of modern technology
makes it possible to obtain evidence from the human body. The Court
balances society's interest in detecting and punishing crime with the indi-
vidual's interest in personal privacy. In this instance, the behavior of the
police in obtaining evidence from the body (as opposed to the mere fact
evidence was obtained from the body) was such that the search was imper-
missible.
There emerge then two ways of reading Rochin. Rochin can be read as
essentially a fifth amendment decision prohibiting forcible extraction of
evidence from the body as a form of self-incrimination. Rochin can also be
read as essentially a fourth amendment decision condemning a particular
course of conduct by the police.
B. Breithaupt v. Abram
In Breithaupt v. Abram, 19 the Court moved away from the self-incrimi-
nation aspects of Rochin. The police ordered a blood sample to be taken
14. Id. at 172.
15. Id. at 173.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 172.
18. Id. at 174.
19. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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from a suspected drunk driver. The blood sample was taken from Breithaupt
while he lay unconscious in an emergency room where he was.being treated
for injuries he had suffered in a fatal automobile accident. The results of
the blood test were admitted as evidence of intoxication at Breithaupt's trial
for manslaughter.
The Supreme Court refused to overturn Breithaupt's conviction holding
that "a blood test taken by a skilled technician is not such 'conduct that
shocks the conscience.' "20 The Court ignored Rochin's analogy between
extracting evidence from the body and coerced confession. The Court's focus,
instead, was on the behavior of the police and the routine nature of a blood
test.
The Court found "nothing comparable here to the facts in Rochin. '"21
Breithaupt was unconscious when the blood was taken, "but the absence of
conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a
violation of a constitutional right."' 2 The Court also pointed out that "[t]he
blood test has become routine in our everyday life.' '23 Finally the court
noted that the blood sample was taken by a skilled medical person in a
hospital.?
Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren adhered to an interpretation of Rochin
as a prohibition of extracting evidence from the body.25 Under this inter-
pretation, Rochin and Breithaupt involve essentially the same fact pattern.
In both cases the government forcibly extracted evidence from the defend-
ant's body.26 Warren argued that distinguishing Rochin from Breithaupt on
the basis of police behavior "would make physical resistance by a prisoner
a prerequisite to the existence of his constitutional rights." 27 Warren went
on to point out that the stomach pumping in Rochin was also a common
medical procedure performed by a doctor in a hospital, 28 According to
Warren, the Court had reduced Rochin to "an instance of personal revulsion
against particular police methods." 29
Clearly the Court in Breithaupt refused to read Rochin as a fifth amend-
ment-type prohibition of extracting evidence from the body. The Court's
methodology is more akin to a fourth amendment reasonableness analysis.
Breithaupt recognizes that competing interests in privacy and law enforcement
20. Id. at 437.
21. Id. at 435.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 436.
24. Id. at 438.
25. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 440 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
26. For a discussion of Rochin as a prohibition of extracting evidence from the human
body see .rupra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
27. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 441.
28. Id. at 440.
29. Id.
1987] 1185
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are at stake and balances those interests in terms of public policy. The Court
cites "[t]he increasing slaughter on our highways," 30 and concludes:
[S]ince our criminal law is to no small extent justified by the assumption
of deterrence, the individual's right to immunity from such invasion of
the body as is involved in a properly safeguarded blood test is far
outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect due to public realization
that the issue of driving while under the influence of alcohol can often
by this method be taken out of the confusion of conflicting contentions .3
Although Breithaupt was decided four years before Mapp v. Ohio enforced
the exclusionary rule against the states the Court was already engaged in
what was essentially a fourth amendment analysis.
II. ANALYSIS OF BODILY INTRUSION UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A. Schmerber v. California
Decided five years after Mapp v. Ohio enforced the exclusionary rule
against the states, Schmerber v. California2 explicitly brought analysis of
bodily intrusion under the fourth amendment. Schmerber also involved a
blood sample taken from a suspected drunk driver. Schmerber, however,
was conscious when the police ordered the blood test and on advice of
counsel he objected to the test. The results of the test were. admitted at trial
and Schmerber was convicted of driving an automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
Schmerber claimed that taking the blood sample was (1) a denial of due
process under Rochin and Breithaupt, (2) a violation of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and (3) an unreasonable search in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment. The Court rejected all three arguments. 33
Rejecting the due process claim, the Court turned Chief Justice Warren's
Breithaupt dissent back upon itself.3 4 Since there had been no due process
violation in Breithaupt, holding for Schmerber after holding against Brei-
thaupt would indeed make actual resistance a prerequisite to the constitu-
tional right established by Rochin.35
30. Id. at 439.
31. Id. at 439-40.
32. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
33. The Court also rejected Schmerber's sixth amendment right to counsel claim. Since
Schmerber was not entitled to assert his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
see infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text, he had no greater right because counsel erroneously
advised him that he could assert it. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765-66.
34. See supra text at note 27.
35. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759-60.
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Rejecting the privilege against self-incrimination claim, the court held that
the privilege applies only to evidence of a "testimonial or communicative
nature."' 36 The Court cited Justice Holmes as authority that, "[t]he prohi-
bition of compelling a man in criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort com-
munications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material." '37
The Court addressed Schmerber's fourth amendment claim under the
premise that "the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified
in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. '3 The
blood test was found to be both justified and properly performed.
Two conditions were set for performing bodily intrusions. First, the court
required a "clear indication" that evidence would be found.3 9 Second, the
government must obtain a search warrant whenever practicable 0 The Court
found that the same facts which established probable cause to arrest (at the
accident scene the police smelled liquor on Schmerber's breath and described
his eyes as having a "bloodshot, watery, sort of glassy appearance" 41) also
"suggested the required relevance and likely success" of a test of Schmerber's
blood for alcohol. 42 Although the blood sample was taken without a warrant,
the search was proper because "the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins
to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate
it from the system." 43
The Court found the blood test to be a reasonable procedure. The blood
test was a highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person
is under the influence of alcohol. As in Breithaupt, blood testing was de-
scribed as a "commonplace in these days of periodic physical examina-
tions."' 44 It was also pointed out that "for most people the procedure involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."' 45
36. Id. at 761.
37. Id. at 763 (quoting Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910)).
38. Id. at 768.
39. "The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained." Id.
at 769-70.
40. "The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue
whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and
great." Id. at 770.
41. Id. at 769.
42. Id. at 770.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 771.
45. Id.
19871
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Finally, the Court concluded that the blood test had been reasonably
performed. The blood sample was taken by a physician in a hospital ac-
cording to accepted medical practices.4 6
Although Schmerber was decided under the fourth amendment rather than
general due process, the Court's analysis is virtually identical to its analysis
in Breithaupt. Both decisions contrast the behavior of the police with the
behavior in Rochin.41 Both decisions point to blood testing as a safe com-
monplace procedure.4 8 In both cases the blood sample is taken by a skilled
medical person in a hospital. 49 Finally, both decisions pointed to blood testing
as an effective means of determining intoxication.50
By explicitly bringing bodily intrusion analysis under the fourth amend-
ment, Schmerber represents a complete break from the self-incrimination
aspects of Rochin. But like Breithaupt, Schmerber is consistent with a reading
of Rochin as a condemnation of a particular course of police conduct.5 1
Schmerber also echoes Rochin's broad concern for human dignity:5 2
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value in our society.
That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited con-
ditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions,
or intrusions under other conditions.53
B. Categorization of Bodily Searches Since Schmerber
In the proliferation of fourth amendment rulings since Mapp v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court has labored in vain to create a coherent body of search and
seizure law. Rather than decide reasonableness on an ad hoc case-by-case
basis, the Court has sought to distill the amorphous concept of reasonableness
into a series of separate inquiries. This attempt to isolate issues and set clear
rules has done more harm than good,5 4 yet the Court continues to pursue
its separate inquiries. Given how the Court decides fourth amendment cases,
it is useful to categorize methods for obtaining evidence from the human
46. Id.
47. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760.
48. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
49. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 438, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
50. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
51. See supra text at notes 18-19, 20-21.
52. See supra text at note 18.
53. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
54. See Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1468 (1985).
"The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and ob-
scurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that every effort to extract themselves
only finds them more profoundly stuck." Id. at 1468. For a discussion of how the attempt to
promulgate "clear rules" in fourth amendment law only sinks the court deeper into confusion,
see infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
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body under three separate fourth amendment inquiries: (1) is there a search?
(2) is a warrant required? and (3) is the search permissible under any cir-
cumstances?
1. Is There a Search?
According to Katz v. United States55 the reach of the fourth amendment
is measured by a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. A government
action which does not intrude upon that expectation of privacy is not a
"search" and does not trigger fourth amendment protection. Under Katz,
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."' ' By this
reasoning, the Court has found characteristics such as a person's finger-
prints,57 voice, 58 and handwriting59 to lie beyond the reach of the fourth
amendment. Therefore, compelled disclosure of these characteristics does
not intrude upon a person's expectation of privacy and is not a "search"
under the fourth amendment.
This is not to say that detention of a person to obtain such evidence does
not implicate the fourth amendment. 60 For instance, in Davis v. Mississippi,6'
Davis and twenty-four other black youths were rounded up for questioning
and fingerprinting in connection with a rape for which the only leads were
a general description by the victim and a set of fingerprints taken from the
scene of the crime. The Court excluded Davis' fingerprints as the fruit of
a constitutionally impermissible dragnet, but held that fingerprinting itself
"involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts
which marks an interrogation or search." ' 62
2. Is a Warrant Required?
Under the foregoing analysis, physical evidence from the human body will
usually involve a "search." Of more practical import is whether the gov-
ernment must get a warrant before searching. One may doubt that the
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 351.
57. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
58. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
60. According to the Supreme Court, Schmerber established that "the obtaining of physical
evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment violation at two different
levels-the 'seizure' of the 'person' necessary to bring him into contact with government agents,
and the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence." Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 8 (citation
omitted). This Note focuses on fourth amendment analysis of the search itself. Fourth amend-
ment analysis at the first level is beyond the scope of this Note.
61. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
62. Id. at 727.
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warrant process effectively interposes a "neutral and detached magistrate"
between a suspect and the police, 63 yet the warrant process is a potential
limit on police discretion at the moment of initial custody. Obviously such
a limit is important to someone confronted with the prospect of an intrusive
bodily search.
Courts have upheld a wide array of warrantless bodily searches.64 Schmer-
ber upheld taking a blood sample without a warrant provided there is
probable cause to search and exigent circumstances making it impracticable
to obtain a warrant. 65 In United States v. Robinson," however, the Supreme
Court held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of
the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." 6 7 A
critical bodily search issue will be whether Robinson is found to authorize
warrantless bodily searches that do not meet Schmerber's probable cause
requirements.
The cases in this area are not very helpful because decisions citing Robinson
to uphold warrantless bodily searches incident to arrest also point out that
the search in question conforms to Schmerber's probable cause require-
ments.6 One case that does expressly use Robinson to chip away at Schmerber
is United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley.69 Acting on five-year old infor-
mation that the defendant was known to carry heroin in her vagina, the
police conducted separate strip searches at the defendant's home and at the
station house. The court objected to the searches because they were per-
63. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, at § 4.2(d) for a discussion of whether laypersons such
as court clerks can effectively administer the warrant system.
64. Among the procedures which have been upheld are: combing hair from head and face,
United States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1981), but warrant required to pluck pubic
hairs, Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (1977); placing hands beneath an ultra-violet lamp, United
States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1974); swabbing hands with a chemical substance,
United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010; scraping
beneath fingernails, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); swabbing penis with a chemical
substance, United States v. Smith, 470 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1972); scraping surface of penis,
Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968), but warrant required to squeeze secretion from
penis, McClain v. State, 274 Ind. 250, 410 N.E.2d 1297 (1980); giving a breathalyzer exami-
nation, Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 678 P.2d 1364 (Alaska App. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 190; and taking a urine sample, Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d
571 (1974). See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, at § 5.3(c).
65. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
66. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
67. Id. at 235.
68. Professor LaFave points to State v. Magness, 115 Ariz. 317, 565 P.2d 194 (1977), where
the defendant was arrested on information he was carrying heroin. A search of the defendant's
car and person revealed nothing, but a strip search revealed a lubricant in his anal area where
he was carrying a packet of heroin. The court upheld the search as a Robinson-type search
incident to arrest, but then stressed probable cause was present. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6,
at § 5.3(c) n.93.
69. 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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formed by nonmedical personnel in nonmedical surroundings.7 0 But defend-
ant's argument that the police lacked probable cause to search "miss[ed]
the mark" in light of Robinson.7'
The court purported to be shocked by the "common and routine practice
in the City of Milwaukee to search the body cavities of females." 72 The
court's holding, however, authorizes that practice so long as the searches
are performed by medical personnel in medical surroundings. To the extent
that Robinson is interpreted as authorizing strip searches without probable
cause, it is in direct conflict with Schmerber's teaching that the fourth
amendment forbids intrusions into the body "on the mere chance that desired
evidence might be obtained." 73
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this issue,74 but it seems that
Schmerber's requirements should apply to strip searches. First, Robinson
did not involve a search of the body.75 Second, in Robinson the Court
pointed out that the search in question "partook of none of the extreme or
patently abusive characteristics which were held to violate the Due Process
Clause . . . in Rochin v. California.'"76 Although Schmerber was decided
under the fourth amendment rather than the due process clause, if Schmerber
is seen as an elaboration on the issues presented in Rochin,77 Robinson
cannot mean to authorize searches that are improper under Schmerber. Third,
Schmerber did not challenge the traditional right to make more routine
searches incident to arrest. Schmerber only held that the policies behind that
right have "little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions
beyond the body's surface." 78
Because they address different kinds of searches, there is no inherent
conflict between Schmerber and Robinson. The cases occupy separate terrain.
Routine searches incident to arrest may be made under Robinson, but searches
which intrude upon a person's body in an intimate way79 will be subject to
70. Id. at 199.
71. Id. at 197.
72. Id. at 199.
73. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
74. In Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), the Court stated, "We were not addressing
in Edwards, [United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (holding that a search which would
have been proper incident to arrest can be performed later at the police station)] and do not
discuss here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be
appropriate." Id. at 646 n.2 (citation added).
75. Robinson involved heroin found in a cigarette package taken from the arrestee's front
coat pocket. 414 U.S. at 223.
76. Id. at 236.
77. This Note contends that such is the case. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text;
infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
78. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
79. Although Schmerber specifically dealt with an intrusion beyond the body's surface,
procedures such as plucking pubic hairs or scraping the surface of the penis (as opposed to
combing hair from the head or scraping beneath the fingernails) would seem to implicate the
same interests in human dignity and privacy as the blood test in Schmerber.
1987]
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Schmerber's probable cause requirements. Under this scheme, absent exigent
circumstances, a warrant will be required for most bodily searches.
3. Is the Search Permissible Under Any Circumstances?
Finally, there are bodily searches so intrusive that they may be imper-
missible under any circumstances. Most notable in this category is court
ordered surgery. Compelled surgery cases arise out of robberies where the
victim is armed and fires on his assailant. After confirming the presence of
a bullet-like object in the defendant's body, the government seeks to sur-
gically remove the object and determine if it is the bullet from the victim's
gun. Although these cases occur infrequiently, they are the subject of lively
debate among judges and commentators because they represent the furthest
limit thus far of bodily intrusion analysis. 0
i. United States v. Crowder
The federal courts first addressed compelled surgery in United States v.
Crowder.8' Acting on information from an accomplice, the police arrested
a robbery suspect who was bandaged on the right wrist and the left thigh.
The prosecutor sought an order authorizing removal of a bullet-like object
from Crowder's forearm.82 The object was located immediately below the
skin and the surgery was to be performed under a local anesthetic. After
an adversarial hearing, the district judge authorized the surgery which took
only ten minutes, did not harm Crowder, and produced a bullet traced to
the victim's gun.83
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the
operation was a reasonable search under the fourth amendment. The court
listed the following factors to support its decision:
(1) IT]he evidence sought was relevant, could have been obtained in no
other way, and there was probable cause to believe that the operation
80. See Mandell & Richardson, Surgical Search: Removing a Scar on the Fourth Amendment,
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 525 (1984); Comment, Search and Seizure: Compelled Surgical
Intrusion? 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 305 (1975); Note, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily
Intrusions, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 130 (1984); Note, Nonconsensual Surgery: The Unkindest Cut
of All, 53 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 291 (1977); Comment, Criminal Law-Lee v. Winston: Court-
Ordered Surgery and the Fourth Amendment-a New Analysis? 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 149
(1984); Note, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Court-Ordered Surgical Removal of a
Bullet from an Unconsenting Defendant for Evidentiary Purposes Held Reasonable Under the
Fourth Amendment, 55 TEX. L. Rav. 147 (1976) [hereinafter Court-Ordered Surgical Removal]
Note, Surgery and the Search for Evidence: United States v. Crowder, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv.
429 (1975).
81. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
82. Doctors advised against removing the bullet from the left thigh because such a procedure
might reduce the use of Crowder's left leg. Id. at 313.
83. Id. at 314-15.
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would produce it; (2) the operation was minor, was performed by a
skilled surgeon, and every possible precaution was taken to guard against
any surgical complications, so that the risk of permanent injury was
minimal; (3) before the operation was performed the District Court held
an adversary hearing at which the defendant appeared with counsel; (4)
thereafter and before the operation was performed the defendant was
afforded an opportunity for appellate review by this court.1
4
Factor (1) reiterates Schmerber's concern that the intrusive procedure is
likely to produce the desired evidence. Factors (3) and (4) expand on Schmer-
ber's procedural requirements. Not only must a search warrant be obtained,
but the defendant must also be afforded an adversarial hearing and an
opportunity for appellate review.
Factor (2), however, is a marked departure from Schmerber. In Schmerber,
the Supreme Court noted that taking a blood sample "involves virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain." 85 In Crowder, the court says only that "the risk of
permanent injury was minimal." Obviously, there is a wide range of ex-
periences with little risk of permanent injury that involve trauma or pain. s6
A vigorous dissent insisted that the court had overstepped the bounds of
Schmerber. Surgery, with its anesthesia, stitches, and scars, is not a routine
event like blood testing. 87 The dissent also argued that the court's analysis
relied too heavily on medical criteria. If the distinction between major
intrusions and minor intrusions is based primarily on medical criteria, judges
are ill-equipped to make that distinction. 88 Furthermore, there is disparate
access to expert medical testimony between prosecutor and defendant. s9
84. Id. at 316. Crowder had a marked impact on state courts considering compelled surgery
cases. Prior to Crowder, only Georgia, in Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350
(1972) and Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973) had approved a court-
ordered surgery under local anesthetic.
Courts in three states had disapproved court-ordered surgeries. Arkansas, in Bowden v. State,
256 Ark. 820, 510 $.W.2d 879 (1974) and New York, in People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210,
362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974), disapproved surgical procedures that threatened to permanently injure
the defendant. Indiana, in Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), held court-
ordered surgery to be unreasonable per se under Schmerber.
After Crowder, four of the six state courts addressing the issue have upheld court-ordered
surgeries. All six courts have followed the Crowder guidelines in reaching their decisions.
Maryland, in Hughes v. State, 56 Md. App. 12, 466 A.2d 533 (1983), Missouri, in State v.
Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); New Jersey, in State v. Lawson, 187 N.J.
Super. 25, 453 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 1982); and South Carolina, in State v. Allen, 277 S.C.
595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982), approved court-ordered surgeries.
Missouri, in State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977) and Florida, in Doe v. State,
409 So.2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) disapproved court-ordered surgeries. The Missouri
Supreme Court found that the trial court below had failed to follow Crowder's procedural
requirements. The Florida court held that the sought-after bullet would be of little evidentiary
value after spending four years inside the defendant's leg. Doe, 409 So.2d at 27.
85. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
86. A trip to the dentist, for instance.
87. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 321 (Robinson, Circuit J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 323.
89. Id. at 323-24.
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Finally, the dissent argued that, because testimony was available from the
defendant's accomplice, there was little evidentiary need for surgery to re-
trieve the bullet."
Commentators also criticized Crowder for measuring intrusiveness solely
by medical criteria. 91 The court was accused of ignoring Schmerber's emphasis
on privacy and human dignity.92
ii. Lee v. Winston
In Lee v. Winston,93 the federal courts struggled to define the proper role
of medical criteria in bodily intrusion analysis. After the Virginia trial court
granted the prosecutor's Motion to Compel Evidence, Lee sought to enjoin
the proposed surgery. When the Virginia Supreme Court rejected Lee's
petition for habeas corpus, Lee turned to the federal courts for relief. On
October 15, 1982 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia denied relief,94 but on November 12, after receiving new evidence
about the location of the bullet in Lee's body, the district court issued an
injunction. 95
The district court dismissed Lee's petition when the evidence showed that
the bullet was immediately below the surface of the skin. 96 After learning
that the bullet was actually 2.5 to 3 centimeters below the surface of the
skin, the court found that circumstances were materially changed because
the proposed surgery would require general anesthetic rather than local
anesthetic, and an incision of 5 centimeters rather than 1.5 centimeters. 97
The district court first of all refused to read Schmerber as announcing a
litmus test for reasonableness. Schmerber was read as "merely identifying
elements of the situation ... that supported the conclusion that the intrusion
in that case was constitutionally permissible." 98 The district court, however,
90. Id. at 318 (Levanthal, Circuit, J., dissenting).
91. Court-Ordered Surgical Removal, supra note 80, at 147.
92. Id. at 158-59.
93. 551 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 717 F.2d 888 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1905 (1984). These are the lower court holdings leading
to Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The facts of the case are set forth supra text at note
2.
94. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 248-53.
95. Id. at 253-61. The district court enjoined the surgery in response to both Lee's petition
for writ of habeas corpus and his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 257-59. The fourth
circuit later determined that the proposed surgery was not "custody" within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute. Lee's claim was treated as being solely under 42
U.S.C. §1983 to enjoin persons acting under color of state law from depriving Lee of his
fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Lee, 717 F.2d at
891-93.
96. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 251-52.
97. Id. at 259.
98. Id. at 260.
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did look to Schmerber for "guidance as to the kinds of factors considered
relevant to a determination of whether an intrusion is 'minor' and performed
'under stringently limited circumstances.' "99
Crowder's heavy reliance upon medical criteria was rejected. "Whether
or not a surgeon would characterize the procedure as 'minor surgery' is of
no moment; there is no reason to suppose that the definition of a medical
term of art should coincide with the parameters of a constitutional stand-
ard."' °  The district court concluded that:
The procedure contemplated here goes far beyond the prick of a needle
in Schmerber, the slight intrusion in Crowder, and the minor procedure
originally supposed to be required in this matter. The Commonwealth
proposes to forcibly subdue petitioner by injection, make a substantial
incision into his body, retract muscle tissue in an attempt to locate the
subject bullet, and if successful in locating it, extract it from his body.
All of this is to be done where the procedure is concededly not medically
necessary for the preservation of petitioner's life and health. Considering
the scope of the intrusion, the risks involved, and the affront to peti-
tioner's dignity, the Court concludes the procedure contemplated is more
akin to the impermissible activity in Rochin than to the minor intrusion
in Schmerber."'
In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. The court of appeals agreed that
"[t]he judicial inquiry is not to make the medical estimate in medical terms,
but is whether, under the totality of the circumstances presented, the pro-
cedure proposed by the state is constitutionally unreasonable." 0 2 The court's
opinion went on to state:
Viewed starkly, the state proposes to drug this citizen-not yet convicted
of a criminal offense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of
unconsciousness, then surgically to open his chest and there to explore
for a bullet .... We hold that this goes beyond the police practices
which the state can legitimately undertake within the bounds of the fourth
amendment.103
While the results in Crowder and Lee are arguably consistent,' °4 the ap-
proaches of the two decisions are not. In Crowder, the D.C. Circuit relied
on medical criteria to determine the scope of permissible intrusion under
Schmerber. This approach reduces Schmerber to an evaluation of medical
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 261.
102. Lee, 717 F.2d at 901.
103. Id.
104. In purely medical terms, it seems that the surgery contemplated in Lee would entail a
greater risk of permanent injury than the surgery in Crowder. But see Mandell & Richardson,
supra note 80, at 541 n.83 (use of local or general anesthetic is not the determining factor in
evaluating potential risk of harm).
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risk and ignores Schmerber's emphasis on human dignity. Furthermore,
Crowder employs a more permissive "risk of permanent injury" standard
rather than Schmerber's "no risk, trauma, or pain" standard. 05
In Lee v. Winston, both the district court and the court of appeals reject
Crowder's reliance on medical criteria. More fundamentally, both courts
rejected Crowder's reductionist approach to analyzing bodily intrusion. In-
stead of trying to lay down a four-part test for all bodily intrusions, the
Lee decisions accept that bodily intrusions must be evaluated case-by-case
given the totality of circumstances in each case.l°6 Such an approach conforms
more closely to the Supreme Court's approach in Schmerber'07 and provides
a better model of fourth amendment decisionmaking 08
C. Winston v. Lee
Returning to the subject of bodily intrusion for the first time since Schmer-
ber, the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee'09 affirmed the decisions of the
district court and the fourth circuit below. The Court first restated the
procedural requirements of Schmerber"0 and implicitly endorsed the special
procedural protections afforded to Lee."' The Court then characterized
Schmerber as establishing a balancing test weighing the extent of intrusion
upon the individual against the community's need for evidence."l 2
Intrusiveness upon the individual was measured not only in terms of
medical risk, but also in terms of affront to human dignity." 3 The com-
munity's need for evidence was measured not only by relevance, likelihood
of retrieval, and unavailability without surgery, but also by the availability
of alternative evidence and the probative value of the desired evidence."i 4
Applying its balancing test to the facts of the case, the Court found the
proposed surgery to be highly intrusive. The Court pointed to conflicting
testimony about medical risk, but seemed to admit that the surgery posed
little threat to Lee's health." 5 The surgery, however, was highly offensive
105. See supra text at note 45.
106. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 260, 717 F.2d at 901.
107. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 137-63 and accompanying text.
109. 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985). For commentary, see Tolley & Hull, Court Ordered Surgery to
Retrieve Evidence in Georgia in Light of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Winston
v. Lee, 37 MERCER L. REv. 1005 (1986); Note, Fourth Amendment-Reasonableness of Surgical
Intrusions, 76 J. Cim L. & CRIMINOLOGY 972 (1985); Note, Constitutional Law-Compelled
Surgical Intrusions Restricted by the Fourth Amendment, 25 WAsHBURN L.J. 123 (1985).
110. Winston, 470 U.S. at 761.
111. Id. at 763 n.6.
112. Id. at 758-60. The Court claims it is applying the "Schmerber balancing test." Id. at
1618.
113. Id. at 761.
114. Id. at 762-63.
115. Id.
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to Lee's interests in human dignity and bodily integrity." 6 Of particular
concern was the use of general anesthetic. After repeating the fourth circuit's
stark description of the surgery," 7 the Court concluded that "[t]his kind of
surgery involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control
over surgical probing beneath his skin."" 8
,Correspondingly, the state had failed to show a compelling need to perform
the surgery." 9 Watkinson's spontaneous identification of Lee, taken together
with Lee being found wounded near the scene of the robbery, dissipated to
the state's need to retrieve the bullet. 20 The Court also expressed doubt
about the probative value of the bullet due to corrosion while inside of Lee's
body.'2'
Winston v. Lee's two most notable features are the Court's strong reaction
in terms of human dignity to surgery under general anesthetic and the Court's
consideration of the availability of alternative evidence as a factor in its
determination of the government's need to search. If Winston v. Lee is
thought of as an ad hoc evaluation of reasonableness, the decision is well-
founded. If, on the other hand, Winston v. Lee is read as establishing a, set
balancing formula for the analysis of bodily intrusion, the decision is prob-
lematical. The decision is problematical because first, human dignity does
not function well as a factor in a mechanical balancing test, and second,
an amorphous concept like reasonableness cannot be arrived at through a
mechanical balancing test.
It is interesting that the Court refers to the "Schmerber balancing test"
when the Schmerber decision makes no reference to balancing. The "bal-
ancing test" language may be insignificant in that any determination of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment involves balancing competing
interests.'2 But so far as the Court is establishing a formula for future
analysis, the Court is embarking on a dangerous course.
Human dignity and medical risk are the two factors in the Court's de-
termination of reasonableness. Clearly, human dignity is something a court
should think about when it evaluates the reasonableness of a bodily intru-
sion.'2 But it is difficult to assign a calculable weight to a concept like
human dignity. Because of this difficulty, in the context of a. mechanical
balancing formula, human dignity will either be outweighed by more tangible
factors or become an empty principle that justifies a judge's subjective
responses.
116. Id. at 764 n.7.
117. Id. at 765.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 765-66.
120. Id. at 765.
121. Id. at 766 n.10.
122. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
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In Winston v. Lee the Court finds that the proposed surgery is highly
intrusive. The focus of the Court's finding is that compelled surgery under
general anesthetic is highly intrusive in terms of human dignity. The Court,
however, fails to distinguish, in terms of human dignity, surgery under
general anesthetic from surgery under local anesthetic.
The Court states that compelled surgery under general anesthetic com-
pletely deprives a person of "ordinary control over surgical probing beneath
his skin." 24 This implies that compelled surgery under local anesthetic entails
a lesser deprivation. How is this so? 25 Crowder remained conscious during
his operation, but he exercised no control over the probing beneath his skin.
In what sense does a person undergoing a rectal probe feel more "dignified"
than a person being operated on under a general anesthetic?
The Court fails to make a meaningful distinction in terms of human
dignity because human dignity is given no content beyond invoking the
fourth circuit's ominous description of routine surgery. 26 As a formula for
determining intrusiveness, Winston v. Lee produces a meaningless distinction
based upon an empty principle.
The other scale of the Court's balancing test, the government's need to
search, provides a clearer distinction between Winston v. Lee and Crowder.
In Winston v. Lee, the availability of alternative evidence was a factor in
determining the government's need to search. This factor was not considered
124. Winston, 470 U.S. at 765.
125. For an argument that there is a significant distinction in terms of human dignity between
surgery under general anesthetic and surgery under local anesthetic, see Mandell & Richardson,
supra note 80, at 542-45. They argue that surgery under general anesthetic is a greater affront
to human dignity for two reasons. First, in as much as consciousness is definitive of being
human, involuntary termination of consciousness is a clear affront to the defendant's humanity.
Second, compelled surgery under general anesthetic invades the defendant's innermost physical
and mental privacy. Id. at 542-43.
Mandell & Robinson define consciousness as "an awareness of self and one's surroundings,
the capacity to consider various courses of action and to choose among them, the capacity to
think, believe, feel, and judge." Id. at 542. Under general anesthetic a person is temporarily
unaware and temporarily unable to think, believe, feel, and judge. Going into and coming out
of surgery, however, the defendant is aware of what will or what just has happened. The
defendant is in the situation of a person falling asleep in jail and waking up in jail. More
importantly, any defendant compelled to undergo any search has lost his "capacity to consider
various courses of action and choose among them." Any search undermines the autonomy of
the individual. The temporary loss of consciousness during surgery does not meaningfully
distinguish Lee from Crowder.
Mandell & Richardson's second point ignores Schmerber's distinction between physical and
testimonial evidence. They describe surgery under general anesthetic as an invasion of the
defendant's mental privacy because the defendant is rendered unconscious. But the defendant's
private thoughts and feelings are not revealed, the surgery provides access only to physical
evidence. In searching for physical evidence the government is constrained by the fourth
amendment's reasonableness standard. Reasonableness, however, is not arrived at by considering
only the use of general anesthetic. Reasonableness for this search like any other search involves
a multi-faceted inquiry.
126. Winston, 470 U.S. at 765 (quoting 717 F.2d at 901). See supra text at note 103.
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in Crowder. Because the availability of highly probative alternative evidence 27
was taken into account, the government had less need to search in Winston
v. Lee than in Crowder.
By looking at the availability of alternative evidence while at the same
time reiterating Schmerber's probable cause requirements, Winston v. Lee
creates a logical bind for prosecutors seeking bodily intrusions. It will be
difficult to clear the Court's procedural hurdles' 28 and still demonstrate a
need to perform the search. The same facts required to show probable cause
that the search will produce relevant evidence will often serve as alternative
proof of whatever the sought-after evidence was to prove.12 9 Because the
government already has alternative proof, the need to perform surgery is
diminished.
When the Court considers the availability of alternative evidence it puts
itself in the difficult position of determining in advance the strength of the
government's case. 30 The Court might also encourage sloppy police work
that relies on bodily intrusions.13' A better approach to evaluating the gov-
ernment's need to search may be to consider if there is a link between the
type of search in question and the broad policy to be served by the search.
Often the results will be identical. The blood tests in Breithaupt and
Schmerber served a substantial public interest in deterring drunk driving.
The blood tests also provided reliable scientific evidence that would be more
useful in court than alternative evidence such as what a policeman saw or
smelled. 3 2 Bullet-retrieval surgery, however, serves no public interest beyond
bringing a particular criminal to justice. These cases arise too infrequently
for compelled surgery to have any overall deterrence effect on the rate.
Also, in order to have probable cause that a bullet from the victim's gun
is inside a suspect's body, the government will need solid information about
when the suspect was wounded, where the shooting occurred, and the location
127. Lee was found wounded near the scene of the crime, Watkinson spontaneously identified
Lee in the emergency room, and the location of the bullet underneath the left collarbone
correlated with Watkinson's statement that the robber jerked to the left when he was shot.
Winston, 470 U.S. at 765.
128. Particularly if the special procedural protections from Crowder are adopted. Because
Lee was given a full adversary hearing and an opportunity for appellate review, they did not
reach the question whether a surgical search can be ordered absent such procedural protections.
Id. at 763 n.6.
129. "The very circumstances relied on in this case to demonstrate probable cause to believe
that evidence will be found tend to vitiate the Commonwealth's need to compel respondent to
undergo surgery." Id. at 765.
130. Id.
131. This could become especially true as technology becomes more sophisticated, and bodily
intrusions entailing less medical risk reveal more information.
132. The Breithaupt decision pointed out that blood tests can also "establish innocence, thus
affording protection against the treachery of judgment based on one or more of the senses."
352 U.S. at 439.
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of the gunshot wounds. This information will serve as alternative proof that
the suspect was wounded by the victim during the crime.
Seen as an ad hoc evaluation of reasonableness, Winston v. Lee makes a
great deal of sense. Privacy and autonomy are at the core of one's sense
of dignity and compelled surgery certainly intrudes upon those interests.'
There was conflicting testimony about the. degree of medical risk involved
in the proposed surgery. The proposed surgery was.not a routine event like
the blood test in Schmerber. There was doubt about the evidentiary value
of the sought-after bullet. The government already had a great deal of
evidence with which to make a case against Lee. Finally, performing surgery
served no public interest beyond convicting Lee.
Seen as a balancing formula for future cases, Winston v. Lee is very
troublesome. 3 4 The decision stresses the distinction, in terms of human
dignity, between surgery, under general anesthetic and surgery under local
anesthetic. Because the Court falls to make a meaningful distinction, one
must conclude that the Court either thought that Crowder was wrongly
decided or chose to create a per se rule against compelled surgery under
general anesthetic. If .the former is true, the Court should have openly
rejected Crowder and said why. If the latter is true, the Court has simply
created another "clear rule" under the fourth amendment. The rule will
increase litigation, spawn "well defined exceptions," and end in confusion
or arbitrary decisionmaking or both.' 3
Hopefully, future courts will read Winston v. Lee the way the district
court in Lee v. Winston read Schmerber.'36 Then, rather than becoming a
litmus test, Winston v. Lee will instead become a broad-based evaluation
133. Although human dignity alone does not provide the basis for distinguishing the result
in Crowder from the result in Winston v. Lee, compelled surgery implicates intimate expectations
of privacy, Because "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State," Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767,
a court must carefully scrutinize all of the circumstances surrounding a compelled surgical
search.
134. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
135. For the view that Winston v. Lee should have given specific weight to the factors it
considered in order to insure more uniform lower court application of its balancing test, see
Note, supra note 109, at 981-82.
136. The court wrote:
The Court will, however, apply the explicit holding of Schmerber:
That we hold today that the Constitution does not forbid the State minor
intrusions into an individual's body under under stringently limited cir-
cumstances in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions,
or intrusions under other conditions.
384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1836. And while the Court does not find a litmus test
in the Supreme Court's observations as to the facts before it, the Court does find
some guidance as to the kinds of factors considered relevant to a determination
of whether an intrusion is "minor" and performed under stringently limited
circumstances.
Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 260 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772) (emphasis in original).
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of reasonableness conforming to the model of fourth amendment decision-
making advocated by this Note.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S BODILY INTRUSION DECISIONS AS A
MODEL OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DECISIONMAKING
Since Rochin v. California the Supreme Court has reshaped its analysis
of bodily intrusion. The Court has transformed a general due process inquiry
into a particular fourth amendment inquiry. 3 7 Accordingly, the Court has
shifted its frame of reference form self-incrimination to search and seizure. 38
Yet despite these doctrinal changes in analysis, there is a continuity to the
Court's bodily intrusion decisions. From Rochin v. California to Winston
v. Lee, the Court has engaged in what amounts to a case-by-case evaluation
of reasonableness,' 3 9 given the totality of circumstances in each case. While
the doctrine underlying the Court's analysis of bodily intrusion has changed,
the relevant factors and competing interests underlying the court's evaluation
of reasonableness have remained essentially the same.
Arguably the results if not the reasoning of all search and seizure cases
are best understood in terms of a broad evaluation of reasonableness. In
the field of bodily intrusion, however, the Court seems less inclined to cloak
its decisions in fourth amendment technicalities and more inclined to openly
base its decisions on the overall reasonableness of the particular bodily
intrusion in question. This kind of frank and broad-based decisionmaking
offers a path out of the wilderness that is current fourth amendment jur-
isprudence.
Each of the Court's bodily intrusion decisions can be understood as an
overall evaluation of reasonableness which looks at (1) the police behavior
giving rise to the government's desire to search, (2) the manner in which
the search is performed, and (3) the link, if any, between the nature of the
search and the government interest served by the search.,4o The Court at the
137. See supra notes 9-53 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. Clearly Rochin's "shocks the conscience" standard is distinct from the fourth amend-
ment's reasonable search standard. But for the purposes of the Note, the point is that in each
of its bodily intrusion decisions (including Rochin), the Court evaluates the particular search
in question rather than sets a clear rule to be followed in the future.
The distinction between the Rochin standard and the reasonable search standard may become
important in the context of habeas corpus petitions. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),
the Court held that a fourth amendment violation cannot be the basis for a habeas corpus
petition. After Stone v. Powell, prisoners might argue instead that a particular search procedure
"shocks the conscience" under Rochin and violates due process.
140. Perhaps this factor should be more broadly stated as the government's need to search.
Breithaupt and Schmerber, however, can be mor clearly distinguished from Rochin and Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) by the link (or lack of link) between the search procedure and the
government interest served. See supra notes 30-31, 130-33 and accompanying text.
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same time balances society's interest in detecting and punishing crime against
the individual's interest in privacy and autonomy over his own body. Taken
together under this view, the Supreme Court's bodily intrusion decisions
form a coherent and predictable set of results.
In Rochin, the police behavior could hardly have been more objectionable.
Without a warrant or showing of probable cause, the police burst into the
suspect's bedroom and violently struggled to remove the capsules from his
mouth. Seen as a continuation of the initial struggle to retrieve the capsules,
the stomach pumping, although performed in a hospital, becomes a violent
invasion of the suspect's body. Finally, there is no particular connection
between stomach pumping as a search procedure and the goal of reducing
the sale of illegal drugs.
In Breithatpt, the police behavior took on none of the violent character-
istics from Rochin. The search procedure, withdrawing and testing a small
sample of blood, was a safe and routine practice performed by a physician
in a hospital. Finally, a scientifically accurate method of determining intox-
ication is closely linked to the important societal goal of fighting drunk
driving. Likewise in Schmerber, the police behavior was beyond reproach,
the blood sample was taken by a physician in a hospital, and the search
was closely linked to enforcing drunk driving statutes.
In Winston v. Lee, the police behaved properly and the courts afforded
the suspect a full array of procedural opportunities. Surgery under general
anesthetic, however, is far more complex and risky than stomach pumping
or blood testing. Finally, compelled surgery situations arise too infrequently
for the procedure to have an impact on crime in the streets.
The Court considers these factors while balancing competing interests in
law enforcement and personal privacy. In Rochin, the Court recognizes that
it is exercising judgment "upon interests of society pushing in opposite
directions.'" 4' Breithaupt balances the "right of an individual that his person
be held inviolable" against the "interests of society in the scientific deter-
mination of intoxication, one of the .. .mortal hazards of the road.'
' 42
While Schmerber does not explicitly state a conflict between law enforcement
and personal privacy, the Court in Winston v. Lee refers to the "Schmerber
balancing test" and applies that test to the surgical procedure in question.'
3
Aside from the probable cause requirement stated in Schmerber and rei-
terated in Winston v. Lee, these decisions do not attempt to enact hard and
fast rules. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern what is important to the
Court and to draw guidance from the decisions. A bodily intrusion in search
of evidence must be supported by probable cause. The search must be
141. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
142. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
143. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763 (1985).
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performed in a safe manner. As the search procedure becomes more complex
and risky, the government must show a more compelling need to search. As
with tort law, this process leads to an evolving set of principles and standards
to guide judges, police, and prosecutors.
This case-by-case evaluation of overall reasonableness in the Court's bodily
intrusion decisions can be contrasted with the futile line-drawing and constant
tinkering that plagues the Court's decisions in other fields of fourth amend-
ment law. 44 For instance, the Court has stated that subject "only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" searches conducted
without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate are per se unreasonable. 45
In fact, the Court has never taken the warrant requirement seriously. The
exceptions to the warrant requirement are "neither few nor well-deline-
ated."'146
One exception to the warrant requirement is for automobile searches. The
exception began with Carroll v. United States 47 where the Court upheld the
warrantless search of a car stopped by two prohibition agents sixteen miles
outside of Grand Rapids, Michigan. The Court recognized that there is a
difference between searching a house and searching an automobile and
created an exception "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought."'14 But the Court added, "[iun cases where the
securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.' ' 49
In Chambers v. Maroney, 150 the police seized a car, arrested its occupants,
and drove the car to the police station where it was searched without a
warrant. The Court, rather than applying the "warrant when reasonably
practicable" requirement from Carroll, instead latched onto Carroll's "cars
144. The following analysis of current fourth amendment adjudication is taken from Bradley,
supra note 54. Professor Bradley asserts that in order to develop a workable fourth amendment
doctrine, the Court must adopt one of two proposed models of the fourth amendment. Model
I is a "no lines" approach insisting only that a search be reasonable, considering all relevant
factors on a case-by-case basis. Model II is a "bright line" approach requiring a warrant for
every search when it is practicable to obtain one. While recognizing that Model I will offend
civil libertarians and Model II will offend "law and order" enthusiasts, Bradley insists that an
intermediate approach will only sink the Court "ever deeper into the mire of contradiction and
confusion" that now exists. Id. at 1501.
This Note contends that the Court's bodily intrusion decisions are a successful, if unwitting,
example of the "no lines" approach proposed by Professor Bradley. As such, the Court's
bodily intrusion decisions are a model of fourth amendment decisionmaking which should guide
the Court in other areas of fourth amendment law.
145. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
146. Bradley, supra note 54, at 1473. There are now over twenty exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the probable cause requirement, or both. Id. at 1473-74.
147. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
148. Id. at 153.
149. Id. at 156.
150. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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are different from houses" language 5' and created an automobile search
exception to the warrant requirement.
In United States v. Ross,5 2 the Court held not only that an automobile
may be searched without a warrant (regardless of whether it would be
practicable to obtain one), but containers found within the automobile,
including locked suitcases, may be searched as well. The process had now
come full circle.
[T]he automobile exception, which was originally developed to allow a
flexible response to the mechanistic warrant requirement when the police
behavior seemed reasonable, has developed a life of its own as a me-
chanistic rule. Even if in a particular case, it would not seem reasonable
to search a car and its contents without a warrant, the automobile
exception has created a new rule that can be applied mechanically to
render patently unreasonable behavior "reasonable" under the-fourth
amendment."'
In fourth amendment adjudication, the Court has embarked upon two ul-
timately contradictory tasks. First, the Court has sought to provide clear
rules. Second, the Court has sought to provide flexibility in response to
reasonable police behavior. The Court has failed on both counts. The Court
creates a clear rule (the warrant requirement). In an attempt to flexibly
respond, to reasonable police behavior, the Court carves out an exception to
the clear rule (Carroll). Over time, the exception takes on a life of its own
(Chambers v. Maroney), and the Court in its desire for certainty hardens
the exception into a new rule (Ross). Seeking to provide clear rules and
flexibility, the Court ends up with the worst of both worlds: confusing
exceptions which evolve into rigid rules mechanically rendering unjust results.
In its bodily intrusion decisions, the Court has avoided this dilemma. As
seen above, the Court has developed a consistent approach to bodily intrusion
utilizing a stable set of relevant factors and competing interests. This con-
sistent approach falls short of setting clear rules, but it does provide guidance.
Moreover, the Court's bodily intrusion decisions do not sacrifice flexibility
to an illusory certainty.
The Court's bodily intrusion decisions avoid another pitfall in current
fourth amendment adjudication. Postincorporation constitutional decisions
based on specific Bill of Rights provisions have tended to focus on narrow
definitional analysis at the expense of broad constitutional interests. 54 In
fourth amendment decisions, this tendency has manifested itself as a focus
on technical issues such as whether a particular police activity constitutes a
151. Id. at 48-49.
152. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
153. Bradley, supra note 54, at 1477-78.
154. See Nowak, Foreward-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World, 70
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1979).
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search within the scope of the fourth amendment 55 or when does a person
have standing to raise a fourth amendment claim. 56 By focusing on these
technical issues, the Court can avoid confronting basic privacy values that
are protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
Take, for instance, an electronic "beeper" used to track a person's wher-
eabouts. In United States v. Knotts, 57 the Court held that use of a beeper
does not constitute a fourth amendment search. Pointing out that visual
surveillance from public places along the suspect's route would have revealed
to the police all of the information revealed by the beeper, the Court stated
that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from aug-
menting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such en-
hancement as science and technology afforded them in this case." 158 By
focusing on the technical issue of whether there is a search, the Court avoids
grappling with the broad privacy interests that would be implicated by
widescale use of beepers. 59
Throughout its bodily intrusion decisions, however, the Court has focused
on the broad constitutional interests at stake. In the preincorporation Rochin,
the Court speaks of the need to not "legalize force so brutal and so offensive
to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect as is revealed by this
record."' 6 In the postincorporation Schmerber, the Court states that "[t]he
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.' 6' In Winston v. Lee,
the Court reiterates this broad view of the fourth amendment and notes its
concern with human dignity going back to Rochin.
62
In its bodily intrusion decisions, the Supreme Court has maintained a
consistent approach, fashioned a logically coherent set of results, and kept
its focus on the broad values underlying the fourth amendment. The court
has refused to engage in a confusing process of line-drawing and tinkering.
The court has refused to hide behind definitional technicalities. For all of
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying
text.
156. For example, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court held that passengers
in an automobile lack standing to raise fourth amendment objections to a search of the
automobile.
157. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
158. Id. at 282.
159. Responding to the argument that its holding will allow unsupervised "twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen in this country," the Court stated that "if such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable." Id. at 283-
84.
All the same, the Court's definitional approach of Knotts provides an ideal vehicle for ignoring
abuse of "beeper" technology should the Court choose to do so.
160. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
161. Schnerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
162. Winston, 470 U.S. at 758, 762 n.5.
12051987]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
these reasons, the Court's bodily intrusion decisions represent a remarkable
achievement.
One could speculate as to why the Court's bodily intrusion decisions have
escaped the booby traps littering fourth amendment law. Perhaps the simple
answer is that there are only four decisions over a period of thirty-five years.
Because the Court has not muddied the waters with an endless series of
rules and exceptions, the analysis of bodily intrusion has remained clearly
focused on the essential question of reasonableness.' 63 The question of why
the Court has resisted the temptation to muddy the waters is left for another
day.
CONCLUSION
Returning to Montoya de Hernandez,'64 it can be seen that the decision
is subject to the criticisms of fourth amendment decisionmaking made in
section III above. Because the Supreme Court bases the decision on border
search exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements, the de-
cision never directly confronts the reasonableness of what happened to the
defendant. The Court simply finds that "the detention of a traveler at the
border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is
justified at its inception if customs agents considering all the facts surround-
ing the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling
contraband in her alimentary canal."' 65
First the Court has engaged in line-drawing. From now on a lower quantum
of evidence than probable cause166 will justify prolonged detention of a
suspected alimentary canal smuggler. By requiring such a low threshold of
suspicion, the court insures that many innocent people will be harassed. 67
163. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, contends
that there is an "uncertainty principle" at work in the judicial process. This judicial uncertainty
principle is akin to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in nuclear physics which holds that
it is impossible to accurately determine both the position and velocity of a particle because the
process of measuring one characteristic creates great uncertainty in the measurement of the
other. Id. at 2 n.5. Likewise, argues Bradley, when the Supreme Court attempts to achieve
certainty regarding a constitutional issue "[t]he process of rendering a decision will tend to
distort the issue decided as well as the applicable precedents and doctrines." Id. at 2.
164. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
165. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311.
166. The difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion is not clear. Probable
cause, however, is understood as involving a higher quantum of evidence. See generally W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.8 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
167. Dissenting, Justice Brennan pointed to a physician who had conducted internal searches
for customs officials (rectal and vaginal examinations and stomach pumping). The physician
testified that only 15% to 20% of persons he examined were carrying contraband. Montoya
de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3319 (citing Thompson v. United States, 411 F.2d 946, 948 (9th
Cir. 1969)).
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Rather than making an ad hoc determination of reasonableness,' the Court
creates a mechanical rule that will undoubtedly work harsh results.
Second, the Court's decision rests on technical distinctions between prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion. The Court never confronts broad prin-
ciples such as human dignity. It is admitted that Montoya de Hernandez'
detention was "long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating."'' 69 But the Court
glibly remarks "both its length and its discomfort resulted solely from the
method by which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into this country."' 170
The length of the detention is described as the time "necessary to either
verify or dispel the suspicion''7 that the defendant was a balloon swallower.
Rather than deal with the fact that Montoya de Hernandez was detained
incommunicado for over twenty-four hours, the Court sets up a technical
level of suspicion and justifies the detention (regardless of the length and
nature of the detention) so long as the suspicion remains.
By contrast the Court's mainstream bodily intrusion decisions directly
confront the issue of reasonableness. The Court has fashioned a logically
coherent set of results without having to wrench the broad concept of
reasonableness into conformity with an endless set of "clear rules" and
''narrow exceptions." As a series of ad hoc determinations of reasonableness,
the bodily intrusion decisions shape the question of reasonableness for future
courts, 172 retain flexibility in the face of varying fact patterns,'73 and focus
on broad underlying principles. 74
If the Supreme Court were to adopt its bodily intrusion decisions as a
model for fourth amendment decisionmaking, perhaps the Court could bring
a semblance of order to what is now chaos.
MICHAEL G. ROGERS
168. While it is difficult to imagine such a prolonged detention without seeking a warrant,
a mainstream reasonableness analysis could be constructed. The Court points to a great deal
of circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a balloon swallower. Id. at 3306-08. The
Court also points to "the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of
illicit narcotics." Id. at 3309. There is also mention of the peculiar nature of alimentary canal
smuggling and the difficulty of detecting such smugglers. Id. at 3309-10. All of these factors
combined might somehow have justified the particular course of events in this case.
Such an analysis is problematical at best, but the point is that the Court would not be
creating a set rule. An ad hoc determination of reasonableness would have only approved of
a particular search without establishing a permissive reasonable suspicion standard for future
detentions.
169. Id. at 3312.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3313.
172. See supra text at note 144.
173. See supra text at note 154.
174. See supra text at notes 160-62.
19871 1207

